Introduction
The oil and gas industry is of great economic significance to many countries, and privatisations of National Oil Companies (NOCs) have often been controversial, as have been the benefits from privatisation more generally.
1 Privatisation certainly offers substantial opportunities to private buyers, but there is concern whether such gain comes at the expense of other groups, most notably the selling state, consumers and employees, and results in aggregate welfare losses. This ambivalence is also reflected in empirical privatisation studies, of which three basic types exist: (1) studies comparing privately owned firms with (different) publicly owned firms (Boardman and Vining 1989) ; (2) studies of corporate performance and efficiency throughout a privatisation process (D'Souza and Megginson 1999) ; and (3) social cost-benefit analyses of privatisation (SCBA) (Galal et al. 1994) . 2 The balance of evidence from the first two types of studies suggests superior performance and efficiency in the private sector (Megginson and Netter 2001) . But critics of privatisation view such findings as inherent to fundamentally different objective functions of the firm, and argue that the social costs of private ownership fail to be captured by narrow measurements of profitability (Bozec et al. 2006) . SCBA is able to resolve many of such concerns -it takes into account institutional changes other than ownership, implicitly includes a control group, and focuses on a broad measure of social welfare -as long as a convincing counterfactual scenario (the hypothetical outcome under continued state ownership) can be constructed.
In this paper we use SCBA to estimate the overall welfare changes from the partial privatisation of Norwegian NOC Statoil in 2001 , and to investigate the distribution of costs and benefits among government, producers and consumers. Statoil is a suitable case study within the oil and gas industry -its corporate performance improvement during privatisation was below-average but directionally in line with the wider sample of global oil privatisations (Wolf 2008b; Wolf and Pollitt 2008) 3 -but also relevant for the broader privatisation debate. It is Norway's largest industrial enterprise and is operating the majority of the national hydrocarbon output -Norway is one of the key exporters in the global oil and gas markets, the sector being of great national economic importance. As of July 2008 Statoil had a market capitalisation of more than US$ 110 billion. Furthermore, the transaction exhibits a typical sale structurepartial privatisation without initial control transfer (Perotti and Guney 1993) -which enables a test of Galal's observation that "partial divestiture can provide gains that equal those of full divestiture" (1994, p.5) . 4 Finally, although Norwegian institutional governance can be expected to prevent any blatant abuse of the privatisation process 5 , it is also not obvious that a decently run state firm such as Statoil has much to gain from privatisation. As Joseph Stiglitz (2007, p.30) sceptically remarks: "By most accounts, Norway's state oil company was both efficient and incorruptible; probably few countries have been able to realize for its citizens a larger fraction of the potential value of a country's resources. In the case of Norway, institutional change may make little difference in either direction (…). Norway's story is important because it destroys the shibboleth that efficiency and welfare maximisation can be obtained only through privatization."
To our knowledge this paper represents the first privatisation SCBA within the global oil and gas industry, which provides a fertile context for studies of ownership change and welfare generation. Firstly, the industry remains economically and politically important, and its role has been further strengthened in recent years.
Secondly, oil and gas has been, together with utilities and telecommunications, one of the key contributing industries to overall privatisation revenues (Megginson 2005) .
Thirdly, although a number of private oil and gas companies rank amongst the largest corporations in the world, the large majority of the world's hydrocarbon reserves are under the control of nation states and their NOCs (PIW 2007) . With dramatic increases in energy prices some countries are even considering revisions to previous choices in favour of private ownership. And fourthly, despite their importance there 4 As Gupta (2005) points out, this represents a test of competing theories on the underperformance of state-owned firms: the political view emphasises distorted objectives, which can only be remedied though a transfer of control, whereas the managerial view (based on agency theory) emphasise the lack of stock-market monitoring. Studies of full privatisation are unable to distinguish between these two theories, whereas successful partial privatisation supports the latter view. 5 Norway is certainly not a typical oil exporting country in terms of institutional context, but the analysis in Wolf (2008b) showed that better country-level governance is negatively correlated with oil company performance improvement during privatisation.
has been surprisingly little systematic research on NOCs in general (McPherson 2003) , and on the link between ownership, performance and welfare generation in particular. 6 From a methodological perspective, this paper is one of the few SCBAs where the counterfactual scenario can be based on a truly comparable, privately controlled competitor subject to the same external environment. The granularity of the available cost data also allows an analysis at the level of main business units rather than the aggregate corporate level, which has rarely been done before.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 characterises the Norwegian oil and gas sector and reviews Statoil's historic development. Section 3 outlines the SCBA methodology and data sources. Section 4 sets out the factual and counterfactual scenarios. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
Case background

Oil & Gas in Norway
Oil and gas, or petroleum in the wider sense 7 , is the single most important industry in Norway today. In 2006, when Brent crude oil prices averaged US$65 per barrel (BP 2007, p.46) , the sector contributed 25% to the country's GDP, 36% to total state revenues and 51% to total exports (NPD 2007) . First commercial quantities of oil in the Norwegian part of the North Sea were found in 1969, and production started in 1971. 8, 9 Production has grown substantially since, until peak output was reached in 2004 at 4.5 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (boe/d). The NCS has now entered its mature phase, but the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) forecasts that current production levels of 4.2 million boe/d can be at least sustained until 2018, thanks to an increasing output of gas. The authorities believe that approximately 60% of the total recoverable liquids have been produced so far, but only 25% of the recoverable gas reserves (see Figure 3 ). 6 Two related papers by Wolf (2008a) and Wolf and Pollitt (2008) are studies of ownership and privatisation effects in oil and gas. See also Al-Obaidan and Scully (1991) and Eller et al. (2007) . 7 The word 'petroleum' literally means 'rock oil' (from the Latin 'petra' and 'oleum'). It is sometimes used to describe liquid hydrocarbons only, but can also include natural gas and related substances. In this paper I adopt the latter and wider definition, in line with the Norwegian authorities. 8 The offshore waters around Norway are collectively known as the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS): the North Sea in the South, the Norwegian Sea, and the Barents Sea in the Far North. 9 Al-Kasir (2006) has a detailed overview of the history of petroleum operations on the NCS. See also Grayson (1981) and Yergin (1991) , as well as the websites of the MPE and NPD. 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 0 
Statoil and the "Norwegian model" of petroleum management
Norway is one of the richest countries in the world -it ranked second in 2006 based on GDP per capita (PPP) as calculated by the World Bank -thanks in no small part to its petroleum resource wealth. But even before the discovery of oil did the Norwegians enjoy a high standard of life, with a successful private industry e.g. in shipping and fishing, and in contrast to the UK on the other side of the North Sea, the Norwegian government did not need petroleum revenues to balance its budget (Grayson 1981) . Having witnessed the macro-economic distortions that oil created elsewhere in the world (Auty 1993; Stevens 2003; Humphreys et al. 2007 ) and worrying about the industry's intrusion into the traditional way of life in coastal communities (Al-Kasim 2006) , Norway decided to pursue a "go-slow" policy with regard to petroleum development (Dam 1974) . It was deemed that comprehensive state control over the sector was the best way to guarantee an appropriate pace of development, and to ensure that industrial expertise was built domestically rather than abroad; state participation in strategic industries also had a long tradition in Norway, in line with social-democratic policies elsewhere in Scandinavia.
In 1971 the Storting (Norwegian parliament) passed the so-called "ten (Grayson 1981) .
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During its first decade of operations, Statoil benefited greatly from three key privileges assigned to it by the state: Statoil was granted a minimum participation of 50% in all petroleum licenses, implying a veto power on all development decisions; the company was carried through the exploration phase by the private co-investors in the respective licenses, i.e. it only had to pay its share in exploration expenses retroactively when a commercial discovery had been made; and once a discovery was declared commercial, Statoil's interest could be increased further by up to 30% (to a total of 80%) based on a sliding scale of production. In return for these privileges Statoil was not only bound by the commercial duties of the Companies Act, but also had to respond to political and social aims of government. The geo-political circumstances were very much in favour of Norway at that time: the OPEC revolution and asset nationalisations in the Middle East had made the private international oil companies desperate for access to new reserves, and a considerable part of the industry's hopes were pinned on the North Sea. The two oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979/80 further bolstered the bargaining position of the Norwegian government, but it 10 The 'ten commandments' were formulated by the Parliamentary Industry Committee, and included in the Recommendation No. 294 (1970 -71), replying to Report No. 76 (1970 were therefore more difficult, and competition from foreign companies in Norway was bound to become tougher (Claes 2002) . Also, Statoil and NH were increasingly looking to compete internationally, outside the NCS, and to do so they would need to be striving for more efficiency and not be seen as being politically directed.
International expansion was indeed supported by the Norwegian government. As the former NPD Director of Resources states: "There is no doubt that the policy of supporting the Norwegian offshore industry (…) had added to the cost of operations.
In return for this additional cost, the expertise that had been 
Privatisation of Statoil
In December 1998, a few months before his resignation, Harald Norvik had for the first time publicly raised the issue of state ownership in Statoil, and called for a review in view of the heightened competition in the industry. As the public reaction was mixed, if not positive (Lismoen 1999; Noreng 2000b) , the centre-right government 17 asked the new board of Statoil and its new CEO Olav Fjell to prepare recommendations for the future development of the group and the SDFI. In August 1999 Statoil management responded with an ambitious plan, in which the company was to be strengthened through the transfer of all or a significant part of the SDFI, prior to a partial privatisation and stock market listing (PIW 1999; Statoil 1999 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 2004 (NOK bn -2007 
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Methodology and data
Social cost-benefit analysis
The SCBA methodology for privatisations 21 aims to carefully identify the overall welfare changes from divestiture -and from possibly related restructuring -as well as the distribution of changes amongst the principal stakeholders. As Newbery and Pollitt (1997, p.278) put it: "[W]ho gained, who lost, by how much, and at what social value"? SCBA answers these questions by comparing the historical and predicted future evolution of the privatised firm with a counterfactual scenario of continued full government ownership. The methodology was first set out by Jones et al. (1990) , and then applied in Galal et al. (1994) to 12 case studies -mostly from infrastructure, airlines/logistics and telecoms sectors -in four developed and middle-income countries. They find that divestiture substantially improved economic welfare in 11 of the 12 cases, with the main drivers being an increase in investment, improved productivity, more rational pricing policies, increased competition and effective regulation. Using the same methodological approach, Jones et al. (1998) Generating Board, but a skewed distribution of benefits in favour of producers - Green and McDaniel (1998) and Domah and Pollitt (2001) . Rail privatisation in the UK and Canada is examined in Pollitt and Smith (2002) and Boardman et al. (2007) , respectively, with both sets of authors finding positive welfare implications from privatisation.
Following Jones et al. (1990) the overall change in welfare can be written as:
where ΔW is the total change in social welfare, V SP is the social value under private operation, V SG is the social value under continued government operation, Z is the sale price, and λ G and λ P are shadow multipliers on government and private funds. Unless these shadow multipliers differ, the sale price is a straightforward transfer of funds from private investors to government with no implications for aggregate welfare. For the initial assessment we thus assume no difference between these multipliers -this issue will be revisited later -and focus on the first two terms of equation (1). Under the same assumption the distributional impact can be simplified to:
where ΔCons is the change in consumer welfare, ΔProd is the change in producer welfare (equivalent to shareholder benefits), and ΔGov is the change in government welfare. 22 Privatisation offers substantial opportunities for private industry buyers or private shareholders, but a key concern is whether such gains come at the expense of other groups, resulting in aggregate welfare losses. Jones et al. (1990) call this the "fundamental trade-off of divestiture" -privatisation might provide improvements in managerial incentives and technical efficiency, but might also lead to allocative inefficiencies and the misuse of market power. Also, the sales price received by the government might not adequately reflect intrinsic asset values.
Fortunately, the first set of issues does not arise under competitive market conditions, in which case the impact on consumer surplus and welfare can be assumed to be zero (Newbery and Pollitt 1997; Boardman et al. 2007) . 23 Although it has a dominant producing position on the NCS, all of Statoil's sales markets have long been competitive: its crude oil production is exported onto the world market, its refined oil products and petrochemicals compete for market share in Scandinavia, the Baltics and North-West Europe against several established downstream players. Natural gas supply into Europe was for a long time characterised by oversupply, with Norwegian producers struggling to conclude long-term sales contracts that merited the development of dry gas or even associated gas fields on the NCS (Al-Kasim 2006).
Since the mid-1990s demand for natural gas steeply increased and producers certainly enjoyed a much better bargaining position. But -other than for considerations of portfolio diversification and energy security in the purchasing countries -Norwegian gas still competes on price against pipeline supplies from the UK, Russia and Algeria, and increasingly against LNG deliveries from elsewhere. It should also be noted thatafter Norway abolished the GFU under pressure from the EU -Statoil-operated gas fields on the NCS compete against fields of other operators, and that even as an operator Statoil is accountable to its peer shareholders in individual field, and has to justify its pricing position in gas contract negotiations. Further to these considerations, there has been no suggestion or empirical evidence yet of changes in Statoil's pricing or output behaviour post privatisation. In summary, it is therefore reasonable to assume that Statoil's pricing and output policies following privatisation did not differ from counterfactual scenarios without privatisation, and that thus ΔCons is zero.
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23 When prices do not change, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) point out that improvements in technical efficiency, i.e. falling costs, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for social welfare to increase. 24 Even if allocative inefficiencies existed and were included in the overall welfare consideration, their impact would likely be very small. Newbery and Pollitt (1997, p.280) measure such effects by the deadweight loss, 0.5εφ 2 as a proportion of expenditure, where ε is the elasticity of demand and φ is the proportional difference between the factual and counterfactual price. A simple alternative estimation is the so-called "Slutsky compensation" (Varian 1984; Galal et al. 1994) , which calculates allocative Given that prices and outputs are the same in the factual and counterfactual scenarios, the change in costs is the same as the change in profits, and based on Boardman et al. (2007) the change in welfare can be written:
where П P is the present discounted value of profits under privatised ownership, П G is the corresponding value under the counterfactual scenario of continued government ownership, and TC is the present value of all transaction costs of privatisation.
'Profits' in this context means public rather than private profits (Jones et al. 1990; Galal et al. 1994) . At this point a short clarification of the terminology is helpful.
Jones et al. refer to the net income (or earnings after tax) from the corporate income statement as private profit. They contrast this with public profit, which differs in several ways, most notably the treatment of non-cash items such as depreciation, interest expenses, and the treatment of taxes, which are not lost for public profits because they accrue to the state. In practical terms, this public profit is very close to the pre-tax value of the enterprise cash flow used in conventional DCF valuation models (Brealey and Myers 1996; Koller et al. 2005) . Because in the following we frequently need to differentiate between pre-tax and post-tax values, the term 'public profit' shall be continued to be used in the sense of Jones et al, i.e. as a pre-tax cash flow value, and 'private profit' (or 'after-tax' or 'shareholders' profit) shall be defined as the portion of that public profit accruing to private investors.
Pub is the present value of public profits, П Priv is the present value of private (post-tax) profits, T is the present value of corporate tax payments, and τ is the effective corporate tax rate. Jones et al. point out a few additional differences between net income and public profit, which are largely due to variations between accounting and economics, but these are of interest for the absolute level of valuation only. When comparing post-privatisation and counterfactual scenarios, which is the principal aim efficiency changes as the previous period's quantity times price change, neglecting the effect of demand elasticity.
of SCBA, the difference principle ensures that virtually all of them cancel out and do not require further attention.
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Although the notation is based on profits rather than costs, it should be reemphasised that both are perfectly equivalent approaches, as the analysis assumes no differences in petroleum prices or revenues between the factual and counterfactual scenarios. The profit notation is chosen because it better reflects our valuation approach (using a full-scale company model rather than a discounted cost stream) and because it provides public and private values for Statoil that can be directly compared to the actual sales price received in the IPO.
The distribution of welfare gains (or losses) is important because the ultimate judgement on success or failure of privatisation often rests on it. Only Pareto improving privatisations, where none of the major stakeholders lose out, are likely to receive public support and approval. In Statoil's case, with consumer surplus unaffected due to the competitiveness of the company's product markets, we can focus on the distribution of welfare changes between the company with its new private shareholders on the one side, and the tax-funded state on the other. Looking at the changes in government welfare first, the state foregoes the company's future public profits generated under the counterfactual scenario, and in return receives the sales price, plus the present value of all taxes and any residual share in the private profits, both generated under private part-ownership. If the privatisation is underpriced, the state recovers some of the Norwegian shareholders' benefits through capital gains tax, but the state in any case also bears the full transaction costs of the sale. Formally, with λ being the share of equity sold through partial privatisation, Z and U being the sales price and amount of underpricing for 100% of the firm, respectively, and θ being the effective rate of capital gains tax, we can write:
Public profits (counterfactual)
Taxation and share of private profits (factual)
Sales price and tax on underpricing which, when the firm is fully divested, simplifies to (see Boardman et al. 2007, p.13) :
The change in welfare to private investors then simply follows as the residual:
Data
Most of the data on operational and financial performance comes from official company reports and disclosures. Annual reports for both Statoil and NH (the primary benchmark for upstream performance) were collected for the years 1996 to 2006.
Particularly useful is the standardised disclosure on oil and gas producing activities (SFAS No. 69), which is mandated by the U.S. SEC and which is available for both firms for the years 1998 onwards.
27 Additional information comes from the Statoil In the simplified case of full privatisation, no underpricing and no transaction costs the new shareholders get the after-tax profits and pay the sales price: Boynton at al. (1999) show that these disclosures are useful indicators for efficiency. however, in estimating Statoil's divisional cost structures (e.g. in refining or natural gas transportation) in greater detail than what is disclosed in the annual accounts.
The author has also conducted informal interviews with a former member of the Norwegian state administration, a former board member of Statoil, and an external adviser to the MPE, all of which were closely involved in Statoil's privatisation process. These conversations served to inform, challenge or confirm many of our principal observations and assumptions. 
Factual and counterfactual
In this section we will briefly present some general considerations in constructing the privatisation scenarios, and then detail both the factual and counterfactual. For ease of presentation we will limit ourselves to two counterfactual cases, with supporting sensitivity analysis to follow. Throughout, we follow Galal et al. (1994) in being deliberately conservative in ascribing certain changes to the cause of privatisation. however, is likely to be offset by the increased competitive pressures on the NCS, which will increase efficiency at Statoil's direct competitors and thus improve Norway's welfare as the tax-collecting host of these firms. Furthermore, the sale of 6.5% of SDFI assets to oil companies other than Statoil -which provided an opportunity to streamline ownership interests, strengthen incentives and improve operational cost structures -was a direct consequence of Statoil's part-privatisation.
Boundaries of analysis
These benefits accrued to Statoil's competitors (and the Norwegian state through taxation), but are not explicitly included in this analysis and provide further upside to our estimate of privatisation benefits.
A key issue in evaluating the costs and benefits of Statoil's privatisation is the company's dominant operatorship position of upstream NCS assets. To diversify 29 Wolf and Pollitt (2008) show that in oil privatisations the majority of performance improvements occur in the three years prior to the effective change in ownership. Excluding all improvements up to six months before the IPO from the benefits of privatisation therefore will underestimate the anticipation effect of privatisation. 
Forecast period and terminal value calculations
As set out before, the analysis is based on a detailed valuation model for the years 1998 to 2010, and a terminal value calculation thereafter. The factual comprises historic accounts until 2006, followed by an explicit forecast period for 2007 to 2010.
The counterfactual scenarios differ from the factual from the year 2001 onwards. For the terminal value, the basic methodology is a simple perpetuity calculation, although this is cross-checked against two alternative methodologies, namely exit multiple calculation and a target return on newly invested capital. In the simplest case, there is no assumed real term business growth (but also no decline) 31 in the period post 2010, but sensitivity checks on this assumption will be presented.
Discount rates
The calculations of present values as of 01 January 2001 use mid-year discounting of annual public profits. All numbers are used in nominal terms, and the applicable discount rates are therefore also nominal. For the two main counterfactual scenarios 30 In practice it is therefore wrong to think of the other shareholders as passive investors only. The have several options for influencing and making decisions, from informal conversations to formal votes at shareholder meetings, and the operator is obviously accountable to them. 31 Assumed inflation in the terminal value period is 2.5%, offset by nominal discount rates (see below).
set out in this paper we use flat nominal discount rates of 6% and 8%, respectively.
They are chosen to bracket a range of other possible discount rates, including annually variable discount rates based on inflation data (CPI or GDP deflators) 32 and assumed real discount rates. Moore et al. (2003) argue for a real social discount rate of 3.5%, but other suggestions exist, including the use of sovereign bond or corporate bond benchmark rates (see Boardman et al. 2006 ). continued growth in Norwegian E&P (mainly through accelerated production and improved recovery), and significant investment in core international E&P projects.
What happened: the factual
Supporting evidence that Statoil indeed managed to improve its internal efficiency and performance, and not just relied on the supporting current of commodity prices, comes from the development of its traded share price relative to industry peers, which were exposed to these same macroeconomic conditions. As shown in 34 The individual stocks are measured in their respective home currencies. Norwegian tax residents are subject to capital gains tax at 28%, part of the discount is reclaimed by the state at the time of the disposition of shares. In addition to the discount, one year after the IPO Statoil issued a total of 1,558,026 treasury shares under the bonus plan (implying that at least 66% of the retail shares were held for at least one year), which at the IPO price are valued at NOK 107.5 million. Beyond these discounts and bonus shares there was no underpricing of Statoil's shares in the conventional sense (Welsh 1989; Jones et al. 1999; Megginson et al. 2000) : the closing price at the end of the first day of trading was NOK 69.0, identical to the issue price. 35 Norwegian retail investors received a discount of NOK 3.0 per share on purchases up to an aggregate purchase amount of NOK 25,000, or, for Statoil employees, up to an aggregate purchase amount of NOK 75,000. Statoil employees received a further discount of up to 20% of the purchase price, limited to a total additional discount of NOK 1,500 per employee. Finally, domestic retail buyers, including Statoil employees, were entitled to one free bonus share for every 10 shares purchased (subject to the same ceiling amounts as before) and held for one year after the IPO. 36 The total discount calculation is based on the following information/assumptions: 62,000 Norwegian retail investors were allocated shares, an average of 382 shares, which -at the discounted retail price of NOK 66 per share -gives an average retail investment of almost exactly NOK 25,000. It is also known that 60% of the then Statoil workforce participated in the offer. We assume that these employees bought the same number of shares as the average Norwegian retail investor and thus received the full additional discount of NOK 1,500 per employee.
The transaction costs of privatisation are detailed in the IPO prospectus. Listing expenses (which include marketing and printing expenses, legal fees etc.) were NOK 352.9 million, and underwriting commissions to the investment banks were NOK 356.9 million. 37 The underwriters and the state also agreed a discretionary incentive payment of up to 0.25% of the aggregate offer value. Assuming that this incentive payment has been made, the total transaction costs are NOK 732.6 million.
What would have happened: the counterfactual
Because Statoil would have operated in competitive markets anyway, its pricing and output policy (in the sense of deliberate output reductions to reap monopoly profits) is unchanged in the counterfactual scenario of continued full state ownership.
In terms of output capacity (i.e. the technical ability to accelerate production from known reservoirs or to improve overall productive potential) we will also take the factual output generation as given, and instead solve for the counterfactual costs to support this given profile. The focus of analysis is therefore on costs -including operating costs, overhead costs and investment costs -and their translation into public profit and welfare generation.
To estimate a range of plausible welfare changes, two main counterfactual scenarios, Scenario A and Scenario B, will be developed in the following. Exploration and production of hydrocarbons is the most important activity within Statoil, and the credibility of the counterfactual scenarios benefits greatly from the fact that (a) a truly comparable competitor exists in the form of NH, which is subject to virtually the same external environment as Statoil; and (b) all E&P costs and results are recorded in detail and in a standardised way within the annual SFAS 69 disclosure. For costs outside the E&P segments, the counterfactual scenarios rely on more general assumptions and extrapolations, based in part on the upstream results.
37 Page 187 of the IPO prospectus gives both a detailed breakdown of the various components of underwriting fees, and an aggregate cost per-share based on simplified assumptions. NOK 356.9 million is the cost estimate based on the detailed disclosure, only slightly different from the estimate based on the aggregate information (NOK 352.9 million). 
Operating cost
In turn, we will examine operating costs (on a per-barrel basis) for all four major business divisions, i.e. NCS E&P, International E&P, Natural Gas, and Manufacturing and Marketing (M&M).
For the two E&P divisions, operating costs (also called production costs or lifting costs) are part of the total technical costs 38 and include the costs to bring oil and gas from the reservoir to the surface, including the maintenance of wells and related facilities, after hydrocarbons have been found, acquired, and developed for production. To derive counterfactual upstream production costs per barrel, two benchmarks are used. The first benchmark is the petroleum business of NH, which is somewhat smaller than Statoil but structurally very comparable. 39 In fact, because of the long-standing domestic policy of balancing state and private Norwegian interests in NCS licence allocations, the two companies often participate in the very same assets: at the time of Statoil's IPO in 2001, Statoil had an equity interest in all of the 15 producing fields that contributed to NH's total equity production, and NH in turn -through these 15 fields -had a shared interest in 71% of Statoil's output. 40 In these fields with joint ownership usually one of Statoil or NH acts as operator with a larger equity interest and the other is a minority shareholder only, so that Statoil still operated 74% of its total equity production and NH operated 68% of its own output.
But it is clear that some degree of operational overlap exists and that therefore the accounts tend to underestimate efficiency differences between the firms: they both benefit from improvements at the other company and are punished for its mismanagement. The second benchmark used for the upstream activities of Statoil therefore is chosen to avoid this type of overlap: the Global OilCo (GOC) is a synthetic aggregate of the largest OECD oil companies, calculated and published by UBS Investment Research. Based on the standardised SFAS 69 disclosures of the constituent parts, the GOC provides a comprehensive picture of the global oil sector cost performance over the same period. The main drawback of GOC versus NH is that it does not reflect the specific circumstances of the NCS -it is broader, but by definition less specific. Figure 6 shows the factual per-barrel production costs for Statoil, Norsk Hydro (both for their NCS operations only) and GOC. In the pre-privatisation period 1998-2000, Statoil's cost were on average 9.1% higher than NH and 5.0% lower than GOC. 
Statoil (NCS) NH (NCS) GOC
where STL is Statoil and BM is the respective cost benchmark used. As before, P is the factual scenario of part-privatisation and G is the counterfactual scenario of continued full government ownership. NH is used as the cost benchmark for counterfactual Scenario A, GOC as the benchmark for Scenario B.
International E&P in principle follows the same methodological logic as domestic E&P, but two issues of industrial substance need to be considered. both implying a natural decline in unit production costs. On balance, operating cost improvements on the international upstream assets are excluded from the two basic counterfactual scenarios, but will be considered as part of the sensitivity analysis. 41 For NH this minimum cost ratio is 1.00 and for GOC it is 0.85 (both are year 2000 values). For neither the Natural Gas or the M&M division are comparable cost benchmarks available. The main operating costs in Natural gas are related to NCS pipeline transport and to export pipeline transport on European gas sales. For M&M, the principal costs are cash operating costs in Statoil's refineries and its Methanol plant.
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Because Statoil's official accounts do not provide a breakdown of intra-divisional costs at this level of granularity, we rely on the allocation estimate made by UBS Investment Research. Due to the lack of appropriate benchmarks no cost savings from either Natural Gas or M&M are included in Scenario A; for Scenario B, we assume counterfactual operating costs to be 5% higher -this is a simplified extrapolation of the results from NCS E&P, where average counterfactual unit costs (2001-06) were 3.9% (NH) and 7.2% (GOC) higher than the Statoil factual case. In both Natural Gas and the M&M division the operating costs included here are under the full control of Statoil management, and it seems reasonable to assume similar cost-cutting efforts as on self-operated upstream assets.
Overhead costs
Overhead costs, classified in Statoil's accounts as selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, are also difficult to benchmark. NH, for once, does not disclose a comparable accounting category. Even those industry peers that do list overhead costs separately vary greatly in their definition, i.e. what kind of costs to be included. Comparing Statoil's SG&A cost over time (and benchmarking it against an inflation index) is also not straightforward as the asset portfolio changes over time.
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In either case, the denominator of a unit cost measure is also difficult to define, which needs to be an index of corporate output across divisions. Based on an approximate analysis Statoil did manage to reduce its overhead costs per unit of output significantly in the period 1998 to 2000 (minus 23% compared to an industry peer average of plus 21%), but there is little evidence of a systematic outperformance in the period post 2000, which could be linked to partial privatisation.
Investment costs
The oil and gas industry is highly capital intensive, and this is particularly true for challenging environments such as offshore deep-sea projects in rough waters. It was shown earlier that non-cash depreciation charges therefore account for the majority of technical costs in Statoil's upstream operations. For valuation purposes and to compute public profits, however, non-cash accounting charges are not particularly useful; instead, a cash-based measure is warranted that reflects investment efficiency.
Part of the standardised SFAS 69 disclosure provides the annual costs incurred (both capitalised and expensed in the accounts) for oil and gas exploration and development activities. Together with the changes in hydrocarbon reserves for that year, they are used to calculate finding costs and finding and development (F&D) costs per barrel of proven reserves added, which have been shown to be good indicators of technical efficiency and future profitability (Boynton et al. 1999 ). If we assume -as beforethe factual output generation as given (i.e. the new reserves found and created, and production drawn from these reserves), differences in F&D costs inform us of the additional investment that would have been required under continued state ownership to support such output.
As before for upstream operating costs, NH and GOC are used as cost benchmarks. To be particularly cautious in the base counterfactual scenarios, we only consider improvements in investment efficiency on the NCS (where Statoil operates most of its assets) and disregard the international operations. Furthermore, we take an 43 The sale of 50% of the retail business to ICA/Ahold in 2000, for example, was responsible for SG&A savings of approximately NOK 1.4 billion in the first year, as disclosed in Statoil's AR. Other portfolio changes might be equally significant, but usually no detailed information is provided.
even stricter view on the historic cost ratio: following equation (8), the minimum historic cost premium of Statoil over the Norwegian assets of NH was 60.9%, and compared to GOC it was 74.9%. But because Statoil in 1999 was hit by the substantial cost overruns at the Asgard field, a one-off event that would have been addressed with or without privatisation plans, we completely disregard this historical cost difference and assume that, going forward, Statoil would have managed to operate at the same level of investment efficiency as its benchmarks. 44 As before NH is used as the benchmark for Scenario A, GOC for Scenario B. 
Statoil (NCS) NH (NCS) GOC
Quality and HSE externalities
Beyond volume, prices and costs, quality is another matter to consider in a SCBA, but often more difficult to pinpoint (Galal et al. 1994 ). Statoil, facing competitive markets and exporting much of its output, can be assumed not to have slipped in product quality. There is at least no evidence available to the contrary, neither in the form of negative press or consumer comments, or in the form of falling market shares.
Statoil's legal stock market disclosures have also been reviewed, and there is no 44 The original development budget for the entire Asgard project (including field, pipelines and land plant), calculated as of 1996, was NOK 31 billion. This was later revised upwards to NOK 47 billion, and in 1999 to NOK 64 billion. Even if we exclude the full NOK 33 billion increase, its net impact on Statoil (25% equity share) split over three years is NOK 2.75 billion, or only 23% of Statoil's average annual development costs on the NCS in the period 1998 to 2000. The provision therefore looks more than adequate. We also do not exclude any potential one-off charges in the factual Statoil numbers post 2001, such as the cost overruns at the Snoevit LNG project in the Barents Sea. 
Operatorship effects
As discussed in Section 4, any incremental value created by the part-privatised
Statoil at its self-operated NCS upstream assets also accrues to its fellow shareholders in the projects and to the state as collector of taxes. This leverage effect of operatorship is therefore included in both scenarios. Statoil's accounts only reflect 33.1% (its production-weighted equity interest in 2006) of these incremental profits, but the 66.9% captured by other parties also need to be included in the SCBA.
Forecast period and terminal value of cost savings
As the terminal value period can carry significant weight in the calculation of net present costs or benefits, the assumption on the long-term development of cost differences is critical. In the absence of perfect foresight, there are equally valid reasons to believe that the differential might narrow or widen over time. Some 45 Based on Statoil's 1999 emissions of 8.8 million tonnes.
previous SCBAs (e.g. Newbery and Pollitt 1997; Boardman et al. 2007 ) hence assume cost differentials to remain constant in the future. 46 Whilst we report the results of such an approach as part of the sensitivity analysis, the base case is again much more restrictive: it is assumed that any existing cost differential between factual and counterfactual in 2006 (the last year of historic data) will be reduced to zero by 2010 in four equal steps, with no cost differences at all arising in the terminal value period.
Results
The benefits of privatisation
Both counterfactual scenarios (with their different cost benchmarks) yield very comparable results as set out in For the distribution of welfare gains, and later for the sensitivity analysis, we will now focus on Scenario A at 8% discount rate (total social benefit of NOK 165.8 billion), as the differences to the other scenario are negligible. Following equation (5) the net social benefit to the Norwegian state from the equity operations of Statoil (i.e. In that world of perfect foresight the private investors would still have made a net gain -paying NOK 48.0 billion for a stake worth NOK 53.6 billion after the efficiency improvements -but much less than they were able to make with the support of increasing oil prices.
Of the total public profits generated by NCS operatorship effects (NOK 110.9 billion), NOK 52.3 billion is taxation attributable to the state, and NOK 58.6 billion is private profit attributable to the fellow shareholders in Statoil-operated projects. 49 As set out earlier, the state itself very conveniently is the biggest co-owner in these projects, followed by NH, which again is 44% owned by the state. Hence NOK 32.0 billion of the "private" profit also accrues to the government.
Taken together, out of the NOK 165.8 billion of net social benefits as set out in The SCBA welfare estimate nevertheless depends on a number of assumptions discussed earlier in this paper. To better understand their importance as value drivers, sensitivities are conducted relative to the "base case" of Scenario A at 8% discount rate. Table 5 shows the incremental change in social welfare from these changes, excluding any operatorship effects (including them magnifies all changes by a factor of approximately three). -E&P NCS operating cost differential based on 3-yr-avg. +15.5 +28% -Include historic cost differential for F&D costs +94.5 +172% -Include E&P International operating costs based on GOC +2.9 +5% -Natural Gas operating costs 5% higher +2.0 +4% -M&M operating costs 5% higher +0.4 +1% -Overhead costs (SG&A) 5% higher +1.7 +3% -Avg. cost differentials 2001-06 carried forward into TV +84.4 +154% --same, but with 2% real term business growth in perpetuity +129.4 +236% --same, but with 2% real term business decline in perpetuity +63.3 +115%
The biggest incremental impact on net social welfare comes from the inclusion of the historic cost differences in calculating counterfactual F&D investment costs, which would add NOK 94.5 billion or 172% to the base case estimate of 54.9 billion.
If the cost differentials on all cost items had been assumed to continue into perpetuity (rather than the rapid phasing out that has been chosen in the base case), this would have added 154% to the estimate of social benefits from privatisation. Assumptions on the long-term business growth or decline (in real terms) only matter for the SCBA if there are assumed cost differences in the terminal value period. Table 5 also shows the sensitivity results under the assumption of ongoing cost differentials, and 2%
annual business growth or decline, respectively. The assumptions on operating costs in E&P International, Natural Gas and manufacturing and Marketing are less crucial for the overall result, as is the assumption on overhead cost savings.
In addition to these formal sensitivities, there is further upside to the base case estimate from the reduction of negative externalities (such as CO 2 emissions or recordable injuries), and from any increases in output -physical production and reserves replacement -due to privatisation. To simplify the analysis we have throughout assumed the factual output profile as given for the counterfactual cases, and solved for the necessary costs to support such output. It is conceivable, however, that pressure from the capital market at least accelerated the deployment of improved recovery technology on NCS fields, leading to a faster (and possibly higher) production from existing reserves.
A downside risk on the welfare estimate from E&P NCS operating costs comes from the fact that the trending up of NH benchmark costs between 2004 and 2006 is largely due to the cost of gas injection on the Grane field, which is expensive but part of the regular development plan in order to extract more oil (Hydro 2007 
Conclusion
This paper presented a social cost-benefit analysis of the part-privatisation of Norwegian state oil company Statoil in 2001, the first such empirical study to be conducted for the global oil and gas sector. SCBA is an analytical framework for systematically identifying the extent and distribution of costs and benefits of privatisation, based on comparing the factual outcome with a counterfactual scenario of continued state ownership. In the case of this paper, the plausibility of the 50 Even if the 1998/99 programme was linked to preparations for privatisation, the overall welfare impact would be limited. Statoil in 1999 capitalised the full costs of redundancy payments as a provision of NOK 0.5 billion, and where contract terminations were voluntary this amount even overestimates the true cost (overcompensation of voluntary leavers). 51 Another option on welfare weights is to assume a strictly Norwegian perspective, assigning zero weight to all foreign benefits, which amount to 30% of total welfare gains in the base case scenario discussed earlier.
counterfactual scenario benefits greatly from the existence of a privately-controlled benchmark company (Norsk Hydro) that is subject to virtually the same operating environment as the privatised firm. Unusually, this SCBA is also based on sufficiently detailed cost data to make the analysis on a divisional rather than a corporate level.
Based on a conservative set of assumptions -including that cost improvements only materialised in NCS upstream operating costs and investment costs, and that any impact on welfare creation relative to operating costs. Only about one-third of the total benefits is generated within the accounting boundaries of Statoil, the remainder comes from the leverage effect of upstream operatorship: Statoil is the technical operator of about 60% of Norway's production, but only holds an average equity interest in self-operated fields of 33%. The other 67% equity interest, plus taxation on the entire projects, also benefit from any efficiency improvements at the operator that is Statoil.
Because the Norwegian state initially retained more than 80% equity interest in Statoil, and because it separately also owns direct financial interests in Statoiloperated fields, the state manages to capture 66% (NOK 109 billion) of the total welfare gains, leaving 4% to private Norwegian shareholders and 30% to international shareholders (all assuming no difference in shadow weights between government and the private sector). If at the time of privatisation the sales price had reflected the true future development of oil prices, then at least another 13% of the total balance might have shifted from the pockets of private investors to the state.
The share performance of Statoil relative to an index of industry peers serves as a useful cross-check for the estimate of social benefits, and its results suggest that our basic estimate is not too high. Along this same line, sensitivity checks on the core modelling assumptions reveal a number of potential sources of upside value.
Being mindful of this being a single company case study only, the findings nevertheless have multiple implications. First, they complement related privatisation studies of the oil sector (Wolf and Pollitt 2008) in showing that oil privatisation, if implemented appropriately within a competitive petroleum sector, can generate substantial improvements in corporate performance and efficiency, as well as in social welfare. Norway's very strong institutional attributes might not seem representative of other oil-exporting countries, but in terms of privatisation-induced performance improvements Statoil actually trails the average privatised NOC (Wolf 2008b) .
Second, the case study shows that even at well-run state-owned companies there might be scope for efficiency improvements though (partial) ownership change.
Third, ownership change in itself is nevertheless no general panacea, and should (often needs to) be supported by complementary restructuring measures. In the case of Statoil, the sale of SDFI assets to the privatised firm, but also to third party competitors, served as an opportunity and incentive to realise available efficiency gains. Fourth, the timing of privatisation also matters: part-privatisation of Statoil in 2001 generated substantial welfare benefits, but strong state involvement in the earlier phases of sector development was probably one of the reasons that overall "few countries have been able to realize for its citizens a larger fraction of the potential value of a country's resources" (Stiglitz 2007, p.30) . Fifth, the benefits from partial privatisation can be very substantial; transfer of full or even majority control is not necessarily required in order to implement a drive for operational improvements.
Sixth, if structured carefully and if the state is not adverse to retaining some of the entrepreneurial risk, the relative share of benefits to the tax-paying public can be very meaningful indeed. For Statoil, of course, the high marginal tax rate of 78% on Norwegian upstream profits and the remarkable leverage effect of technical asset operatorship were important reasons for this outcome, but the overall structure of the transaction and of the state's involvement at multiple levels might be of interest to policy makers elsewhere. 
